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Serial # AL9566

HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO San Francisco, California 96602

3/CWL/wlc
4 Jul 1966

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines
Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1-30 June 1966
Ref: (a) MCO 5750.1
(b) DivO 5750.1
(c) RegO 5750.1A

Encl: (1) Organizational Data and Sequential Listing of Significant Events from 1-30 June 1966

1. In accordance with references (a) through (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.

Walter Moore
WALTER MOORE

5TH MAR SEC FILES

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ENCLOSURE (4)

COMMANDER'S NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The month of June was one of unprecedented activity in the Battalion's TAOR. In addition to the major Operation "APACHE", the Battalion spent many hours planning and rehearsing for Operation "KANSAS" and Operation "WASHINGTON", neither of which materialized for the Battalion's participation. One exception to this generalization was the heliborne insertion of Company "E" into the KANSAS area after a devastating B-52 attack on enemy installations there. Company "E"'s mission was to observe the area and to assess the bomb damage. The company was extracted after its history-making task, and although it had received enemy fire in the area and had inflicted considerable additional damage through the accurate delivery of its own 81mm mortar fire on enemy installations and troop concentrations, the company suffered only one wounded from punji stakes near the landing zone.

Operation "APACHE" was noteworthy in that a 4.2 mortar battery and a 105mm battery were heli-lifted into the Battalion Combat Base. This gave 2/5 direct fire support in a most intimate sense.

Enemy contact in the Battalion's TAOR has been developed by forcing the VC out of the hills to fight for rice. Villagers have continually related that the VC are not coming to the hamlets to steal food because of the Marines intensive and aggressive patrolling. By denying them free access to the area, we have been forcing their hand.

In late June the Battalion's TAOR was extended to the north and west to take in two new areas extremely important to future operations.

a. To the north - an area averaging approximately 1500 meters in width and stretching almost 6500 meters west from the coastal region north of the SONG TRAU. This area includes the hamlets of TIEN XUAN (1) and (2), both known to be VC controlled and both of which are currently the center of our attention.

b. To the west - a similar sized area to the west of our TAOR was annexed to include mountains and valleys which offer good avenues of approach into the 2/5 TAOR.

In order to keep the enemy off balance, this Battalion has increased its patrolling and ambush activity in order to exploit additional opportunities for seeking and engaging the enemy on ground of our own choice.

The month of June has seen considerable rotation of companies, with each of the four companies occupying each major sector of the TAOR. The month ended with Company "H" (Rein) occupying Hill 35 and providing additional security for the 5th Marines CP and the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines at the same general location by outpostting two points toward SONG TRAU and one point near the hamlet of KHUONG THO (1). Company "E" occupies the area of Hill 76, but has broken a long precedent by only outpostting the hill and establishing the company CP and two platoons (-) in a Company Combat Base just outside the hamlet of TANH MY TRUNG (1). The other platoon of Company E continues its close relationship with the PF forces by the joint occupation of the KY PHU (2) area and the security element at the AN TAN bridge. Company "F" provides the patrolling elements and

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security for the sector which includes the Hill 69 complex. Company "G", which recently returned from OPCON of the Chu Lai Defense Command, is the battalion reserve.

Efforts to work with and train the Vietnamese Popular Forces personnel within the TAOR have resulted in, among other accomplishments, the active establishment of the Combined Action Squad. This squad, consisting of 13 men under the leadership of First Lieutenant BOONE, has established its headquarters in the hamlet of LY TIN, and will train and live with the PFs recruited from this area. This is expected to vastly improve the working relationship between the villagers and the Marines, and will undoubtedly have far-reaching effects.

The MEDCAP program under the guidance of the Battalion Civil Affairs Officer and the Battalion Medical Officer has accomplished more in its role of treating civilians in hamlets throughout the TAOR during June than during any other month of its existence here. Imaginative routing and energetic application of the program's principles have led to renewed public interest and stimulated the support of the local RVN District and Provincial officials.

The Battalion CP on Hill 69 is continuing to improve living and working areas in order to provide a more comfortable place for the troops. Work is being accomplished in the following areas:

- a. Improvement of the perimeter, and the relocation of Battalion supply and motor transport.
- b. Construction of a new messhall and a shower unit.
- c. Resurfacing of roads and terracing new areas for construction.
- d. Establishing a Marine Exchange and planning the location for a Battalion Post Office branch.
- e. Reemphasizing supply economy through special command attention to reduction of both needless waste and negligence in discarding usable items of supply. This has been a major problem in the past, but considerable progress can now be seen.
- f. NCO leadership training.
- g. Mine and booby trap indoctrination.

The exchange of personnel among the 1st, 5th and 7th Marines continues in the effort to equate commands with respect to RTD and numerical strength. Although the Battalion's personnel strength is substantially less than T/O, this Battalion is ready to go anywhere, anyplace.

This Battalion has created an operational program of activity within its TAOR designed to find the enemy, fix, fight and destroy him. Large areas where the Viet Cong previously felt free to roam are now denied him, and he must fight or flee to survive. In this concerted effort to pacify the area, all supporting arms, including tanks, ontos, LVT's, mule-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles, flames (both flame tanks and the infantry back pack flame guns), have been used extensively. Scout dogs are also being frequently used in Search and Destroy operations whenever feasible.

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A number of Company and Battalion size operations have been conducted in the TAOR. This, coupled with a realistic civic action program, has resulted in supporting the Battalion motto: "In order to control you must patrol."

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SECTION I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Location During Reporting Period
 - a. Chu Lai, Vietnam
2. Period Covered by Report
 - a. 1 June - 30 June 1966
3. Commanders Staff and Principal Subordinates

<u>Billet</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Period (if not entire)</u>
Commanding Officer	LtCol W. MOORE	
Executive Officer	Maj. L. W. T. WALLER II	1-4 June 1966
	Maj. R. F. MALDEN	5-30 June 1966
S-1	1stLt J. J. COWART	
S-2	Capt. R. D. HEMENEZ	
S-3	Maj. L. E. WOOD	
S-4	Capt. M. C. PEASE	
Communications Officer	Capt. L. W. FAHRNI	1-28 June 1966
	1stLt J. L. REILLY	29-30 June 1966
Supply Officer	2ndLt D. W. MONTANA	
CO H&S Company	Capt. R. D. HUGHES	1-25 June 1966
	1stLt J. T. JENKINS	26-30 June 1966
CO Company E	Capt. J. L. COOPER	
CO Company F	1stLt G. S. BURGETT	
CO Company G	1stLt L. BOONE III	1-2 June 1966
	Capt J. M. GRUNER	3-30 June 1966
CO Company H	1stLt J. J. DOHERTY	1-25 June 1966
	Capt R. D. HUGHES	26-30 June 1966

SECTION II - S-1

1. Personnel

- a. Average Monthly Strength. Task organization was as shown below during the period covered.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
H&S	20	312	3	47
CoE	4	166	0	0
CoF	4	166	0	0
CoG	4	164	0	0
CoH	4	173	0	0

b. Casualties

<u>BATTLE</u>				<u>NON-BATTLE</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>Serious</u>	<u>Non-Serious</u>	<u>Death</u>	<u>Total</u>
1	20	1	0	13	32	0	67

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c. The following number of personnel joined during the period covered.

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
5	47	0	0

d. The following number of personnel were transferred during the period covered.

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
11	136	0	4

Chargeable personnel strengths continued to decrease during the period. End of period strengths show a loss of 7 USMC officers, 127 USMC enlisted and 2 USN enlisted. The greatest decrease in strength came on 28 and 30 June, when 41 and 39 men in OF 03 were transferred to the 1st Marines. On 23 June, 25 men OF 03 were transferred to the 7th Marines. These transfers helped reduce the "hump" of RTD's in February 1967 to approximately 380 men. This figure is excessive at this time; however normal attrition and personnel exchanges with the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines will reduce this number to an acceptable level. At the close of the period, critical shortages are as follows:

- (1) 9 Lieutenants 0302
- (2) 2 Gunnery Sergeants 0369
- (3) 8 Staff Sergeants 0369

e. Problem Areas.

(1) The largest problem, by and large, is shortage of personnel. At the close of this period, this battalion was 13 officers and 284 enlisted below T/O.

(2) A source of some consternation has been the faulty administrative procedures that allow replacement personnel to arrive "in country" without having travel liquidated by either the staging command or the intermediate command on Okinawa. This just increases the administrative burden on already over-burdened combat committed organizations. In many instances, personnel report without their original orders. These personnel state that their orders were either taken from them or lost at intermediate processing stations.

f. Discipline, Law and Order

- (1) Courts-Martial tried: 2 Pending: 3
- (2) Non-judicial punishment:
 - (a) By Battalion Commander: 6
 - (b) By Company Commander: 13

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g. Morale, PX and Postal Affairs

- (1) Morale continues to be excellent.
- (2) This organization was fortunate to obtain an exchange retail store at the battalion CP area. Even though the store has been in operation only a short time, the troops are very pleased with the service and variety of items offered.
- (3) Postal service has been good to excellent for the majority of the period.
- (4) Special Services has continued to provide movies at least four nights per week. In addition they have obtained a cinemascope lens, and have been placed on a regular scheduled film distribution circuit. The communications platoon, with the aid of borrowed engineer equipment, has completed a regulation volleyball court which has been put to good use. Writing kits, "pocket" books, water sports equipment, balls and gloves are available for check out.

h. Chaplain's Activities

- (1) In the month just completed, the Battalion Chaplain held Catholic Mass on forty-five (45) occasions (Sundays and weekdays) for personnel of this command. A total of 1058 attended. These Masses were held in the various areas in the battalion TAOR.
- (2) While working with our own personnel in the field, services were held for the Protestant men on three (3) occasions with a total of fifty-nine (59) attending.
- (3) In addition, the Battalion Chaplain has provided Catholic coverage for 1/5, the regimental CP, 2/11, 1stATBn, and 1stTkbN.
- (4) The regular Sunday worship service for Protestant men in the 2/5 battalion CP has been provided by Chaplain Paul PEARSON, the 2/7 battalion Chaplain, and Chaplain Milton HINDERER, the 5th Marines Regimental Chaplain.
- (5) A Lutheran Communion service was begun on Thursday mornings at 1130.
- (6) A Bible study class has been initiated on Tuesdays at 1630.
- (7) Three (3) memorial services were held for personnel of this battalion; one Mass was offered for a deceased member of 2/11.
- (8) The Battalion Chaplain participated in "Operation APACHE" and in three (3) company-size sweeps.

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SECTION III - S-2

1. General

a. Routine intelligence processing during June was accomplished by compiling intelligence information received from 5th Marine Regiment, 1st CIE, 9th IFF, Ly Tin District Headquarters, Tam Ky District Headquarters and 1stMarDiv (G-2).

b. Patrol debriefing forms from 1stReconBn were also used.

c. Dissemination was made by spot report, daily intsum and briefings.

2. Briefings

a. Briefings were held daily at 0730 and 1830 by the intelligence officer or intelligence chief and cover intelligence matter during the 24-hour period.

3. Reports

a. Spot reports and daily intsums are submitted.

b. Submitted one negative report of 2GI/bdd over Force 0 7000.2 dtd 25May66

c. The S-2 submitted a number of National Agency Checks, Background Investigations and Certificates of Clearance.

4. Statistics

a. VC KIA (CONFIRMED) 15

b. VC KIA (POSSIBLE) 9

c. VC WIA (CONFIRMED) 17

d. VC WIA (POSSIBLE) 10

e. VC SUSPECTS 21

f. Operation APACHE

(1) VC KIA (CONFIRMED) 24

(2) VC KIA (POSSIBLE) 41

(3) VC WIA (POSSIBLE) 24

(4) VC CAPTIVES 13

(5) VC SUSPECTS 12

(6) WEAPONS CAPTURED: 1 French MAS 36 7.5mm Ser No. 43538 (returned to captor); 1 U. S. Thompson submachine gun, 1 U. S. carbine, 1 six-foot spear.

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SECTION IV - S-3

1. General. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, having fully adjusted to the climate, terrain and the combat situation peculiar to the Chu Lai area of Vietnam, continued to operate aggressively within the Battalion's assigned TAOR and on major operations outside the TAOR. The Command Operations Center functioned effectively and efficiently during the period; Many S/D operations were conducted and many others were planned. Frag orders were prepared and tactical units displaced, but many plans were cancelled at the last minute due to the changing situation or other operational commitments.

2. Operations.

a. Operation "Incinerator" (2nd Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 6-66) terminated at 011720H June 1966 with excellent results. (See chronological sequence of events 01000H to 012400H June 1966).

b. Operation "APACHE" (2nd Battalion, 5th Marines Operation Order 305-66) was conducted 9 June to 12 June 1966. From the standpoint of coordination of supporting arms, long range logistical support and rapid heliborne movement of troops to initiate and exploit physical contact with enemy forces, Operation "APACHE" is considered a success. (See Tab A to enclosure (1) -- Combat After Action Report -- Operation "APACHE.")

c. 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 7-66 and 14-66 (see tab B to enclosure (1)), were joint operations with USMC/Regional Forces/Popular Forces with 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines units acting in a supporting arms role or as blocking forces for Regional Forces/Popular Forces operating under Ly Tin District Headquarters. Although little enemy contact was made in either operation, valuable experience was gained in coordinating operations with our Vietnamese allies.

d. 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 15-66 (see tab C to enclosure (1)), was a search and destroy mission conducted to destroy all uninhabited shelters and other covered positions that could be utilized as a refuge by the Viet Cong in the hamlets of Ky Long (1) and No Name Village in the vicinity of BT4305 and BT4405 (see chronological sequence of events 29000H to 292400H).

3. Training.

a. Formal type training within the command was limited because of operational commitments. Training accomplished consisted primarily of:

(1) Preventive maintenance of motor vehicles and motor vehicle operators school.

(2) Preventive maintenance of communications equipment and communications school.

4. Psychological Warfare. Psychological warfare is covered in chronological sequence of events and Operation "APACHE" After Action Report (Tab A to enclosure (1)).

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5. Chronological Sequence of Events. The following was the chronological sequence of events within the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines assigned TACR for the period 010001H to 302400H June 1966.

010730H While a Plt blocking force fr CoG at BT422093 was moving forward to occupy its position in Operation "INCINERATOR," they received approx 50 rds A/W fire fr undetermined number of VC located on north side of SONG TRAU River at BT416092. Plt returned fire w/ 150 rds S/A and A/W rds & (5) 3.5 WP rds. Enemy fire was quelled. Ontos moved to friendly position to give support & a helicopter gunship was requested to be on station. No further contact made. 1 USMC WIA MedEvac DOW.

011930H Plt fr CoE observed 3 armed VC headed toward SONG TRAU River at BT424097. Patrol fired 40 rds S/A & A/W fire at VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA who fell in river. The other 2 VC appeared to be WIAs. Patrol searched banks of river for body and other VC but due to heavy vegetation along banks & currents in river were unable to make contact.

011100H Plt fr CoE at BT421099 recd heavy S/A & A/W fire fr vicinity BT 414095. Returned fire & plt called for an air strike on the enemy area. A Sparrow Hawk Plt was heli-lifted into LZ at BT412089 as a blocking force. In conjunction, elements of CoE were dropped into LZ at BT421099. Enemy fire ceased.

011250 Plt fr CoE completed sweep of the high ground at BT416093 after an air strike and tank fire on area. Three (3) VC KIA & 1 VC KIA by air reported & 4 VC KIA possible by air along with 6 VC WIA confirmed by air. No further contact made.

011405 Patrol fr CoE at BT417097 began search of area in which 1 VC KIA by air was reported. While searching area patrol spotted 6 VC in khaki uniforms & camouflage caps w/ weapons run into open fr vicinity BT417095. Patrol opened fire on VC, resulting in 2 VC WIA possible as the VC fled. Patrol searched village apprehending 1 man and 1 woman VCS who gave warning to VC. No further contact made.

Operation "INCINERATOR" commenced at 010500H employing CoE (Rein), CoG (Rein) and 2ndBn, 5thMar Command Group Alpha. With the mission of establishing blocking positions on three sides of KHUONG NHON (1) & (2) hamlets, the Bn(-) provided fire & physical support to the RVN Regional Forces Company 744, which swept through the hamlets on a sweeping mission. The operation functioned beginning with a preparation of the fired objective by ontos, tanks, artillery, mortars and flame tanks. Early scattered sniper and automatic weapons fire was received, resulting in a casualty (WTA-DOW) in CoG. The RF Co swept the hamlets without contact, but when the company left the area, CoE (-) began to sweep in behind the RFs until a Plt from CoE received relatively heavy A/W and S/A fire from the west of its blocking position on the northern side of the SONG TRAU. UH-1E's on station were called in after a Sparrow Hawk helo-lift of a reinforced platoon of BoF was requested. UH-1E's then controlled A-4 bombing runs on entrenchments and positions near TIEN XUAN (1) from which the enemy fire was being delivered on a CoE unit. The Sparrow Hawk platoon was inserted and swept the area without further contact while a second platoon was heli-lifted into the trouble area. At the same time a patrol from the third platoon

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in that area sighted 6 uniformed VC in TIEN XUAN (1) and took them under fire. The operation continued sweeping northeast on both sides of the SONG TRAU toward Route 1 without further incident until it terminated at 011720H.

022140H Ambush fr CoG at BT436089 recd 19 rds of S/A fr BT455091. Ambush returned fire w/ 80 rds of S/A & A/W fire, resulting in two nuts being set on fire. Ambush swept area without further contact. 1 USMC WEANE

031100 Patrol fr CoG at BT423091 recd 5 to 9 rds S/A fire fr 1 VC at BT419093. Patrol returned fire w/ 20 rds S/A fire, pursued VC but lost contact at SONG TRAU River.

031500H Patrol fr CoG at BT437096 recd 7 rds S/A fr unknown number of VC at BT438096. Patrol returned fire w/ approx 40 rds of S/A & A/W fire. Golf 6 observed action & sent a reaction force. Five men were seen leaving area where fire was recd fr patrol & apprehended the 5 men as VCS. Prior to apprehending the 5 VCS, 2 men were seen lingering in the area. Search of that area revealed two grenades. The 5 VCS were evacuated to IIT. No further contact.

031200H 2ndBn 5thMar released fr OPCON 1stMar at 031200L. 2ndBn 5thMar assigned under OPCON 5thMar.

040200H Plt fr CoB on a search and destroy mission at BT433091 took into custody 1 VCS due to his ID card not being similar to usual ID cards carried by civilians. VCS taken to Hill 69 for further investigation.

050830H Patrol fr CoG at BT433088 recd 3 rds S/A fr vicinity BT433090 fr unknown number of VC. Patrol immediately deployed & swept through area fr which S/A fire was recd. Patrol fired 1 M-79 grenade & five rds S/A. When patrol reached area fr which fire was recd, contact was broken by VC. Route of enemy withdrawal could not be determined.

042120H Perimeter security fr 2ndBn 11thMar at BT440086 recd 15 rds S/A fire fr vicinity BT441086. Fire was returned w/ 10 rds S/A fire. VC broke contact.

042305H 2ndBn 11thMar GP at BT440086 recd 15 rds A/W fire, 100 rds S/A fire. Fire was returned by GP security; VC broke contact.

Training Report: Due to the heavy operational commitments during the period 30 May through 5 June no formal instruction was conducted.

PSY War Report: During the period 30 May through 5 June approx 100 handouts on rewards were passed out within the TAOR for giving information to Marines on mines/boobytraps. There were 18 MEDCAPs conducted during the reporting period. In this program 1418 medical patients & 88 dental patients were seen.

061100H Patrol fr CoG recd 15 rds S/A fire fr BT422097. Patrol returned fire w/150 rds S/A & 3 M-79 rds. Maneuvered across river & searched house believed to be the source of enemy fire. Found rifle cleaning equipment and apprehended 2 women & 1 child VCS in house. VCS were turned over to 5thMar S-3 for further transfer to IIT.

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071700H Patrol fr CoG moved into a village. A woman shouted "Americans" & approx 15 persons fled fr village & 1 rd S/A fire was fired at patrol. Patrol captured 1 woman and 1 boy VCS, unable to locate other personnel that fled. VCS evacuated to 1stMedBn.

071800 Patrol fr CoG observed 2 VC moving toward trench line at BT 425096. VC were taken under fire & fled toward SONG TRAU River. While patrol pursued 2 more VC were spotted. 1 VC jumped into hole near river bank & patrol leader threw a frag grenade into hole. 1 VC KIA. Remaining VC broke contact & disappeared in brush around river.

072130H Fireteam ambush fr CoG at BT454037 heard 2 or 3 unknown persons moving away fr ambush position as USMC moved in. Attempted to halt personnel, threw 2 grenades, fired 6 rds S/A; results unknown. Area was searched at first light without contact.

061400E Squad fr CoG while working on a detail in conjunction w/ PF personnel at BT444048, set off booby-trapped hand grenade, resulting in 4 USMC & 1 PF WIA. WIA were MedEvacuated to 1stMedBn.

081900 Patrol fr CoG proceeding to their ambush site rec'd 15 rds S/A fire fr 3 VC vicinity BT452095, resulting in 1 USMC WIA (Regt Hq, 5thMar), MedEvac requested. Patrol returned enemy fire w/300 rds S/A and A/W fire, resulting in 1 VC KIA. Due to adverse weather the MedEvac copter could not find the LZ and was taken under heavy A/W fire fr vicinity BT422096, resulting in helo gunner KIA. Helo returned to base. Patrol returned to Hill 35 w/ WIA. Arty called on enemy position & 96 rds 4.2 WP fired. No further contact.

During the period 9 June to 12 June 1966, 2dABn, 5thMar participated in Phase II of Operation "APACHE" with the battalion establishing the combat base in an occupied hamlet, essentially remaining there for the entire operational period. Companies of the battalion used this base as one from which daily search and destroy missions were launched (see Tab A, Combat Operation After Action Report, 2ndBn 5thMar Operation Order 305-66.) In addition the battalion continued to maintain its assigned TACOM with the 6th battalion rear CP remaining on Hill 69.

090730H Patrol fr CoG rec'd 5 rds S/A fire in vicinity BT422099. Patrol returned fire w/ 50 rds S/A. Patrol searched area & discovered 1 VCS WIA. Requested MedEvac, but VCS died before it could be accomplished. No further contact.

090840 Patrol fr CoG encountered booby traps at BT423095, resulting in 2 USMC WIA. WIA MedEvac to 1stMedBn.

091015 Patrol fr CoG at BT457057 rec'd 4 rds S/A fire fr BT456035. Patrol observed 3 VC, returned fire w/ 100 rds S/A fire. Pursued but lost contact.

081530 Patrol fr CoG had one Marine step on a nail-type booby trap wired to an M-26 frag grenade. Marine was not injured. Booby trap was disarmed and returned to company position, where it was destroyed.

101545H Patrol fr CoG at BT455075 observed 2 VC carrying weapons at BT 454074. Patrol immediately took VC under fire & VC fled in a SW direction. Patrol pursued but lost contact in heavy undergrowth. Area searched without further contact.

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121200H Patrol fr CoG recd 10 rds S/A & 25 rds A/W fire fr BT445045. Returned fire w/ 100 rds S/A (2) 3.5 WP rds and 5 HE, and 2 WP 81mm rds. Swept area as far as possible due to known booby traps in the area. While sweeping recd 5 rds S/A fire fr BT438052, returned fire w/ 300 rds S/A & searched area. Recd 7 more rds S/A fire fr BT442047, marked area from which fire was coming with 3.5 WP rd. Fired 4 rds 81mm HE, searched area & found 2 blood trails. Followed them to No Name Village (BT445052); where trail was lost. Area searched; no further contact.

Training Report: Due to Operation "APACHE" and other operational commitments during the period 6 June through 12 June, no formal instruction was conducted.

PSY War Report: During the period 6 June through 12 June two (2) leaflet drops were conducted within our TAOR. Approximately 70,000 leaflets were dropped; loudspeakers were also used in conjunction with one drop conducted on 9 June. Handouts, loudspeakers and leaflets were utilized on Operation "APACHE." There were 13 MEDCAPs conducted during the reporting period. In this program 1599 medical patients were seen and 423 received personal assistance.

140645H Patrol fr CoG at BT418089 & patrol fr CoG at BT423095 recd 5 rds S/A fire fr vicinity BT417091. Patrols returned fire; observed 2 VC hit. 1 possible KIA & 1 WIA (confirmed) by search of area which discovered blood stains. No further contact.

Information recd fr PF Lieutenant in KY PHU (2) placed a VC local force unit estimated at Battalion size in KY LONG (2) at BT436045 for the past 3 days.

151430H 2ndBn 5thMar commenced 24-hour S&D operation in southwest portion of 2ndBn 5thMar TAOR. Arty preparation began on proposed landing zone at BT402071. Companies G & F were alerted & went into landing zones for pickup by helicopter.

151500H A heavy section of tanks fr 1stPlt CpA 1stTkBn & a section of ontos fr 1stFlt CoA 1stATBn, with one Plt fr CoE, moved into position along ridgeline at BT435058 to support CoG & CoF in their S&D mission.

151520H Air strike preparation of LZ at BT402071 w/ 400 lbs napalm.

151530H CoG commenced helicopter pick up fr LZ BT435078. At 151545 CoG commenced landing in LZ BT403072. At 151605H CoG all down in LZ & commenced sweep south along stream and gully toward objective at Hill 270 complex BT424048. No enemy contact reported.

151558H CoF commenced helicopter pickup at LZ Hill 69 BT466073; at 151605 first units of CoF started landing in LZ BT415032. At 151630 all units of CoF in LZ & commencing sweep east toward KY LONG (2) BT436045. No enemy contact reported at this time.

151635H 81mm mortar heli-lifted to Hill 76 BT451039 for direct support of CoF.

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151638H 12 VC spotted moving along trail at BT413031. CoF checking area for VC.

151640H Tanks commenced firing at suspected area at BT429055.

151722H CoF extending fr BT406056 to BT413040 and moving forward. No contact with the enemy.

151725H CoG at BT405055 and moving. No enemy contact.

151730H Tanks firing mission on caves at BT409069. Caves destroyed.

151732H CoF directed to sweep hamlets at BT422039-BT426042. CoG directed to move 1 squad 2ndPlt fr KY PHU (2) BT475051 to Hill 76 BT451039 to join 2ndPlt & to engage in active patrolling tonight.

151755 CoG directed to check out area vicinity BT422050 & BT429046.

151815H CoH returned to Hill 69 BT413031. Will take over Bn perimeter defense.

151825H 1stPlt CoF searched area in vicinity BT421039. Now moving to KY LONG (2), checking suspected areas along way. 3dPlt at BT410035.

151825H CoG non-combat heat casualty at BT405055. MedEvac completed at 171855H.

151845H 1stPlt CoF 1 USMC WIA punji stake wound right foot at BT408033. First aid administered; wound not serious.

151925H 1 USMC CoG non-combat heat casualty at BT405056 MedEvac at 152000H

151920H Plt patrol fr CoF at BT433041 recd approx 5 rds S/A fire fr vicinity BT433042. Plt returned fire w/4 rds S/A fire, resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 rifle, 4 grenades and 1 hammock captured.

152020H Bn perimeter recd 6-10 rds sniper fire at BT467073. Perimeter defense returned fire w/ 60 rds MG and 2 M-79 rds at BT468074. Illumination requested & 2-3 men seen running north; no further contact.

2 USMC non-battle casualties (heat) 1 USMC WIA punji stake (not serious)

1 VC KIA (confirmed body count)

1 rifle captured

4 grenades

1 hammock

Disposition of units and CP location at 152000H is as follows:

Battalion CP remain unchanged.

CoG CP & 1 Plt are located in a defensive perimeter at BT415051. 1 Plt located at BT421047 in defensive perimeter & 1 Plt Hill 76 BT 452039. At first light Plt at BT421047 will join CoG CP group & will move to LZ at BT405065 for heli-lift to Hill 69.

SECRET

2nd Plt CoE w/section of tks & ontos in defensive perimeter at BT435062. At first light will move to Hill 35 to be picked up by trucks & returned to Hill 69.

2 Sgds CoE located at BT478050 KY PHU (2); will walk into Hill 69 in the morning.

CoE CP plus one sqd on Hill 69.

CoF moving to Hill 76 BT452039 where they will remain for the night. CoF to be heli-lifted at 0730 fr Hill 76 to Hill 69.

CoH on Hill 69 mans the Bn defensive perimeter.

LATE ENTRY: 152109H Bn perimeter recd approx 20 rds S/A fire in vicinity BT468074 Perimeter returned fire w/80 rds S/A & A/W & 2 M-79 rds. Tanks moving to provide illumination, 81mm mortar firing illumination. Enemy broke contact.

160900H Operations terminated.

162330H Bn perimeter of 2nd Bn 5th Mar at BT468069 recd 50 rds S/A fr unknown number of VC at BT468069. Perimeter returned fire w/ 150 rds 7.62mm & 81mm mortar fired 8 rds illumination. VC fire ceased.

18 June unit moves in 2/5 TAOR

- a. CoE will have Co (Rein) at Hill 69
- b. CoF will have Co (Rein) at Hill 35
- c. CoG will have Co (-) 2 Plts at Hill 76; 1 Plt (Rein) at KY PHU (2)
- d. CoH will have Co (Rein) at Hill 69; will have perimeter defense, working parties & convoy escort details plus patrol activity.

All readjustments will be completed by 1300, 18 Jun 66.

Upon Bn 3-company deployment, the 3/7 company will take over at Hill 35, and CoG will have:

- a. Co Hq & 1 Plt (Rein) on Hill 69
- b. One Plt (Rein) on Hill 76
- c. Two squads at KY PHU (2)
- d. One squad at AN TAN bridge

190730H Sgd patrol fr CoG at BT432037 recd 2 USMC WIA fr unknown type boobytrap USMC WIA Belo Evac to 1st Med Bn. Patrol continued mission.

Training Report: Due to operational commitments during the week of 13-19 June 1966 no formal instruction was conducted.

PSY War Report: The following was accomplished in PSY Warfare during the week of 13-19 June 1966:

There were 12 MEDCAPs conducted during the reporting period. 2,450 medical patients were treated & 762 personnel received personal assistance.

SECRET

CP Locations:

Bn CP -- 464072
 CoE -- 464072
 CoF -- 435078
 CoG -- 451039
 CoH -- 464072

200150H Fireteam ambush fr CoF at BT433088 spotted 3 VC moving into ambush site. Patrol opened fire. 2 VC KIA confirmed, 1 VC escaped ambush; 1 VC WIA possible. 2 rifles and 6 grenades captured. Patrol searched area w/o reestablishing contact with VC WIA (possible).

200735H Bn Command Group 2/5 at BT439100 rec'd 3 rds S/A fire fr vicinity BT431098 CoE directed to search area. No contact resulted.

200940 Patrol fr CoF at BT424091 discovered been can booby trap with unknown triggering device. Booby trap destroyed in place by grenades.

200040H E Btry 2/11 commenced receiving incoming 60mm mortar fire & assault upon position. 2/5 alerted to move out in support at 200515. CoH & Bn Command Group 2/5 moved fr Hill 69 BT464072 on S&D mission NW along Route 1 to ONG BO Bridge BT430110. 200540H CoF on Hill 35 BT435078 commenced S&D mission NW fr Hill 35 BT435078 toward TIEN XUAN (1) BT416096. At 200821H CoH in vicinity ONG BO bridge BT430110 commenced S&D SW along both banks SONG TRAU River. 200940H 1 Plt CoH established blocking position TIEN XUAN (2) BT425102 in support of CoF sweeping TIEN XUAN (1) BT416096. 2/5 Bn Command Group situated at BT439100. 201022H CoH returned to Route 1 at ONG BO bridge & commenced to sweep NE fr BT4311 to BT4609 then south along east side Route 1 to Hill 69 BT464072.

201030H CoF moved fr TIEN XUAN (1) BT416096 to ONG BO bridge BT430110; directed to search & clear south and west along Route 1 to Hill 35 BT435078. At 201330 all units 2/5 returned to positions.

201300H Sqd size patrol fr CoG at BT425025 tripped a booby trapped hand grenade, resulting in 1 USMC WILDE.

201345H Sqd size patrol fr CoG at BT444053 encountered an obstacle on the trail. While engaged in removing it rec'd 4 rds S/A fire fr vicinity BT440054. Patrol immediately returned fire w/ 15 rds S/A & 4 M-79 rds. Observed 2 VC and pursued, but lost contact. Searched area with no further contacts. Found 9-year-old child w/ stomach wounds. Wounds appeared to be about 1 day old. Child evac to 1stMedBn.

201900H Fireteam ambush fr CoF at BT448075 rec'd 4 rds S/A fire fr vicinity BT447077. Returned fire w/ 30 rds S/A fire. VC fire ceased.

Squad ambush fr CoH rec'd 15 rds S/A fire fr vicinity BT472075. Patrol returned 45 rds S/A fire & A/W fire. Searched area w/o making contact.

211520H LY TIN District Hq passed to S-3 2/5 the following information:
 211510H Mr. NCTO located at EI PHU (2) BT475050 reported to LY TIN District Hq that 4 VC were situated in tree at BT421042 w/ binoculars. 24 rds 105mm HE fire on suspected CP at BT211545E w/good coverage on target. No known casualties observed.

SECRET

231050H Sqd size patrol fr CoF at BT432096 observed 2 VC moving across sandy area vicinity BT433097. Patrol set up ambush site at BT432096 for remainder of the day. No further contact.

241110H Plt fr CoB on S&D mission at BT436046 tripped an M-26 grenade booby trap resulting in 2 USMC WIAs. USMC WIA Helo Evac to 1stMedBn.

241340H Sqd fr CoE on an S&D mission at BT458068 recd 6 rds S/A fire fr BT459069 fr estimated 2 snipers. Sweep of the area by patrol resulted in negative contact.

241506H Sqd fr CoF on S&D mission at BT421093 observed 4 armed VC dragging a body at BT419093. Patrol fired 15 rds S/A fire & VC fled w/ body. A sweep of the area resulted in 1 VC KIA (possible).

241530H Hq Sect of CoE at BT440014 found 1 bouncing type mine w/trip wire at above coordinates. Mine was blown in place.

241620H S-2 OP located a deserted VC base camp vicinity their position BT424049.

251125H Plt patrol fr CoE on a clearing operation at BT416038 recd 3 rds S/A fire fr vicinity BT421036. Patrol returned fire & searched area w/ no further contact.

251220H Patrol fr CoB discovered & blew in place a 155mm shell & 1 bouncing type mine at BT428047. Continuing on, patrol observed 12 VC vicinity BT437056. Called in 81mm fire & searched area with no contact.

251730H CoE located on Hill 76 BT451039 recd 2 rds S/A fire fr vicinity BT455042. Searched area w/EG scope. Unable to observe any sign of VC. Many people in fields and normal activity in hamlets.

261010H Case 19 (Jamplain) recd 4 rds sniper fire fr unobserved direction while moving south in vehicle on Route 1 at BT430109. No action taken; convoy continued on mission.

261030H Sqd (-) CP on Hill 270 BT443048 observed approx 3 VCs digging in bushes at BT434035. VCs took cover every time helicopter passed overhead. Arty mission called, 18 rds HE & 9 WP fired on target area w/ good coverage. 1 House destroyed; VC fled area. No observed casualties.

261010H Plt patrol fr CoE on S&D recd 3 rds sniper fire. Patrol searched area with no contact.

261345H Sqd security patrol fr CoF captured 1 VCS w/ no ID cards. Returned VCS to Hill 69 for forwarding to IX TIF.

CoE Plt located at KY PHU (2) CP BT473049 reported 4 Vietnamese children injured when WP grenade they were playing w/ exploded in hamlet. Villagers brought children to CP for MedEvac. MIA NGOTO investigating. No Marines involved.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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Training Report: Due to operational commitments during the week of 20-26 June 1966 no formal instruction was conducted.

PSY War Report: The following was accomplished during the period of 20-26 June: There were 16 MEDCAPs conducted. 1,711 medical patients and 33 dental patients were treated. 964 persons received personal assistance and 70 persons attended English language classes.

CP Locations:

En CP -- 464072

CoE -- 451039

CoF -- 464072

CoG -- 525089 GHQ LAI Defense Command

CoH -- 435078

262100H CoE on HELM 76 BT452039 observed apparent signal light flashing at BT426046. Fired 81mm mission w/ good coverage.

262116H Perimeter defense BT468067 rec'd 1 rifle grenade approx 50 meters in front of bunker. Area illuminated; no further contact.

262120H CoF ambush BT476073 rec'd 3 rds S/A fire in unknown number VC vicinity BT420076. Unable to determine exact location of VC. Moved to different ambush position.

262540H CP on HELM 270 spotted apparent signal lights fr burned hut BT427049. Fire mission was called w/ good coverage. Believe that VC departed before impacting of rounds.

271132H Hq CoH BT451039 observed 2 VCS at BT442041. Man appeared to be changing clothes & acting in a strange manner. Fired 81s w/ good coverage. 2 VC KIA possible. Patrol checked area w/ no contact.

271230H CoH patrol at BT425068 observed arty rd flash 2 VC w/ carbines. VC attempted to run for cover. S/A fired & VC fell into bush, apparently wounded. Searched area w/ no contact. 2-VC WIA possible.

271340H CoH at BT425097 discovered 50 expended cartridges and 1 60mm fuze assembly. One USMC WIA on jungle stake.

271415H CoH at BT452092 found VC propaganda material. Material will be forwarded.

271900H Sqd fr CoH on S&D mission at BT424091 observed one VCS at BT433087. Patrol pursued VCS & man disappeared into cave. Patrol searched 30 feet into cave & could not reestablish contact.

272130H (Fireteam) Sqd fr CoH at BT452095 observed 3-4 VC at BT 423093. Patrol fired 12 M-79 rds, 250 M-60 and 30-40 rds S/A. VC returned 12 rds S/A. VC fled into thick underbrush with 3 VC WIA possible. Patrol searched area and could not reestablish contact.

ENCLOSURE (1)
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272135H Sqd (-) CE fr Coas-2 at BT421047 observed movement of 5 VC during the firing of illumination at BT433057. Arty mission fired by 4.2 mortars of 14 rds w/ excellent coverage.

272330H Fireteam ambush fr CoH recd 200 rds A/W & S/A fire fr BT423093. Ambush returned 10 M-79 rds, 300 rds S/A & returned to EMBL 22 position. Position fired 450 rds S/A, 1 WP & 1 KB 3.5 rds. Position observed 4 VC hit under illumination. Sqd size patrol searched area at first light without contact. 4 VC WIA possible.

272530E Sqd ambush fr CoH at BT432089 recd 12 rds S/A fr BT433088. Ambush returned 8 rds M-79 & 40 rds S/A. 1 VC KIA possible & 1 VC WIA possible.

280130H Fireteam (Rein) in ambush site fr CoH at BT423092 recd 2 grenades & 10 rds S/A & 50 rds A/W fr estimated 12-15 VC at VT426091. Ambush returned 400 rds A/W, 4 rds 3.5, 100 rds S/A resulting in 1 VC KIA possible & 2 VC WIA possible.

280130H Sqd ambush fr CoH at BT432089 recd 1 grenade, 80-100 rds S/A fr estimated 10-12 VC at BT433087. Ambush returned 150 rds M-60, 100 rds S/A, 12 grenades resulting in 1 VC KIA & 2 VC WIA possible.

280215H CoH at BT433075 recd 30 rds S/A & A/W fr estimated 10 VC at BT423093. Binocular returned fire w/ 200 rds M-60, 100 rds S/A & tks fired 1 rd 90mm & 300 rds 30 cal resulting in 2 VC WIA.

281030H Sqd reinforced w/ 2k engineers & 2 scout dogs fr CoH at BT434089 found 3 caves, 1 spider trap & trench line vicinity BT434089. Patrol burned out caves & destroyed w/ demolition after a secondary explosion in cave.

291320H Sqd (Rein) blocking force CoH at BT431059 heard approx 20 rds S/A fire fr vicinity BT427056. Rds did not appear to be fired at friendly coordinates. Patrol checked out area w/o contact.

290920 Engineers & flame team att to Plt (Rein) fr CoH on S&P mission in KY LONG (1) burning out & destroying caves encountered secondary explosions fr what appeared to be a cluster of anti-personnel mines of unknown type. Engineers discovered 1 pressure release type mine w. mine detector indicating another mine beneath first one. Devices destroyed in place.

290930H Flame team att to Plt (Rein) fr CoH on S&P mission burning holes & houses in KY LONG (1) BT436051 set off ammo caches & many secondary explosions.

Engineer team att to Plt (Rein) fr CoH on S&P mission discovered homemade mine of 50 cal brass casing w/ apparent friction type fuse above container of TNT size of C-ration can. Destroyed in place.

291100 MEDCAP team att to Plt (Rein) fr CoH on S&P mission discovered 2 81mm rounds, 4 fuzes, 5 segments air rockets, 2 60mm mortar rds, 1 3.5 rocket discovered in tree at BT428046 KY LONG (1). Believed to have found possible VC mine & booby trap manufacturing center. Engineers destroyed tree & ordnance.

SECRET

300725H Plt at AN TAN bridge BT497067 while checking boats on the SONG AN TAN River apprehended 1 VCS with no ID. Sent VCS to HVT.

[Faint, mostly illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]

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SECTION V -- S-4 & SUPPLY

1. General. During the period 9 June to 12 June, the Battalion operated our LHA to resupply the troops on Operation "AhaCik." Over 120,000 pounds were heli-lifted in 122 flights. The overall support by FLSG-B for "must have" items has been adequate. A total of 445 requisitions have been submitted this month with 83 being completed for a 20% fill ratio. Requirements for support in general have been supplied from operating stocks and material ordered while on Okinawa, excluding rations, fuel and ammunition.
2. Problems. There is still a continuing requirement for certain items of individual equipment: air mattresses, ammo pouches F/M-14, entrenching tool covers, canteen covers, and other items of a general high usage nature. Rodent control items, insecticide and mosquito repellent, clothing in-kind and organic remain in high demand.
3. Transportation. In general, transportation has been sufficient for normal day to day operations. It is evident that under operational conditions transportation supplied by Division is not adequate to support our requirements. Normal supply on rations would require one vehicle making two trips a day. Under normal conditions at least four trips a day could be accomplished by our unit if loading equipment were available at FLSG-B. Under the present method of operation we are required to load the rations by hand.

SECTION VI -- MEDICAL AND DENTAL

1. Significant events. No unusual medical problems during this last month.
2. New developments. No new developments during this last month.
3. Problem areas. None.
4. Average daily number of patients seen -- 17.
 - a. Total number of patients seen for month -- 510.
5. Number of referrals to 1st Medical Battalion -- 50.
6. Routine Medical Complaints

a. Diarrhea	60
b. URI	47
c. Dermatitis	79
d. Urinary tract infections	15
e. Gastroenteritis	4

SECRET

7. Significant diseases to the area -- 12 cases of malaria.
8. Number of emergency cases, treatment and type.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>FIRST AID</u>	<u>EVACUATED</u>
a. Shrapnel	8	2	6
b. Missile	3	0	3
c. Lacerations	17	16	1
d. Burns	7	6	1

9. Dental referrals -- 86.

SECTION VII - COMMUNICATIONS

1. General

a. Communications during Operation "APACHE" were difficult because of the distance and terrain, but contact was maintained with all units by the companies relaying messages.

b. The AN/PRC-25 radios continue to operate very well with a minimum of maintenance problems. Parts for the AN/PRC-10 and AN/PRC-6 continue to be in short supply, especially IF cans, AM-427, and tubes, 5672, 5676 and 5678.

c. On 28 June 1966 a wire line was laid by helicopter between KY PHU (2) and Hill 76 to establish communications from Hill 35 to KY PHU (2) and Hill 76. The simplest method of expending each roll of wire individually from the helo was found to be the best of a number of recommended procedures.

d. This organization has expended the following during the period covered:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
(1) PA-586	386
(2) BA-279	961
(3) BA-27C	319
(4) Wire	15 miles

- e. All communications equipment continues in optimum daily use.

SECTION VIII - FIRE SUPPORT

1. Artillery/81mm Mortars

a. The Battalion was supported by the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines.

b. Offensive preparation fires were used for helicopter landing zones during 9-12 June 1966.

SECRET

c. Statistical Summary

(1) Total number of missions fired

(a) Artillery -- 465

(b) 81mm Mortars -- 158

(2) Types of missions

(a) Unobserved

1. Artillery -- 163.

2. 81mm Mortar -- 0.

(b) H&I Fire

1. Artillery -- 191.

2. 81mm Mortars -- 0.

(c) Observed fire

1. Artillery

a. Registrations -- 15.

b. HE -- 86.

c. ILL -- 14.

2. 81mm Mortars

a. Registrations -- 14.

b. HE -- 35.

c. ILL -- 42.

(3) Rounds Fired

(a) Artillery

	HE	WR	ILL
1. 155H	19	20	0
2. 105H	1274	61	33
3. 142	1913	199	47
(b) 81mm Mortars	681	403	198
(c) Total	3857	683	276

SECRET

2. Naval Configuration Naval gunfire was employed on 9-12 June 1966.

3. Air support and defense

a. Close air support

- (1) Fixed wing 7
- (2) Armed helicopter 4

b. Helicopter support

- (1) Troop lifts 9
- (2) Resupply 38
- (3) MedEvac 26
- (4) Reconnaissance 12
- (5) Aerial observers 3
- (6) WAC(A) 6
- (7) Administrative 13

c. The experience gained from coordinating and executing the heli-lift of artillery into the field was invaluable. No serious problems were encountered. The air support flown for this unit continues to be of an outstanding caliber.

d. Air defense -- not applicable.

SECTION IX -- CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. General. During this reporting period the Civil Affairs/Civic Action program of this Battalion has become firmly established within the assigned TAOR. This program is two-fold in nature. It is designed to (1) cultivate the good will of the Vietnamese people and their acceptance of our presence in Vietnam, and (2) to utilize our military manpower, equipment, materials and skills, in cooperation with local civil authorities, to improve the economic and social conditions found within those portions of KY SANH and KY KHUONG villages located within Ly Tin District, encompassed by the TAOR. Primary emphasis has been placed upon the medical and dental aspects of the program. This has resulted in the people rapidly gaining confidence in United States forces, and in laying the necessary groundwork for expanding our assistance.

2. Medical and dental. Medical Civic Action Patrols (MEDCAP) are now reaching 85% of the population living within the TAOR. This expansion has been accomplished by both the increased MEDCAP activity and by utilization of medical personnel made available by the 1st Hospital Company and the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines.

SECRET

Medical and dental treatment has been provided by the medical personnel of this Battalion as follows:

	<u>MEDICAL</u>	<u>DENTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Men	1038	69	1107
Women	1326	153	1479
Children	<u>4927</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>4953</u>
Totals	6391	248	6639

3. Personal Assistance. This phase of the Civic Action program has produced the following results: 1600 pounds of scrap lumber have been donated to District and Village Chiefs for use by refugees and the needy; 476 pounds of food has been donated to the District Chief for use by refugees and detained VC suspects; 1139 bars of soap have been distributed to the people; and 35 pounds of village clothing has been distributed to the village chiefs.

4. Evacuation Assistance. One adult and six children have received medical attention at facilities other than those available within this Battalion. This attention was primarily surgical in nature, including two goiter operations, one harelip operation, and evaluation of birth defects requiring possible surgical correction.

5. English Language Classes. Commencing on 20 June, an English language class was initiated utilizing a Staff Sergeant as the instructor and classroom facilities provided by the Ly Tin District Chief in one of his headquarters buildings. Classes are currently scheduled for one hour three times a week. An average of 24 persons has attended each class so far. Retention rate is exceptionally good, indicating student use of the textbook which has been provided for them. Increased interest in this area will require formation of an additional class.

6. Construction Projects. To date one school house is under construction in KY KEUCONG village. Plans have been submitted to higher headquarters requesting that three school houses in KY SANH village be repaired. The feasibility of constructing a bridge across the An Tan River near the hamlet of KY PHU (3) is now being determined. If found feasible, then a request will be forwarded to higher headquarters requesting that the required materials and skilled supervisors be made available.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

DOCUMENTS:

- Tab A - Combat After Action Report - APACHE

Tab B - Frag Order 7-66 of 8 June; 14-66
of 22 Jun

Tab C - Frag Order 15-66 of 27 Jun

TAB A ENCLOSURE (1)

Command Chronology for the peiod 1-30 June 1966

CONFIDENTIAL MODIFIED
HANDLING AUTHORIZED

HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/VHS/ggl
22 June 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division (Rein)
Via: Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines

Subj: Combat Operation After Action Report

Ref: (\$) 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines Operation Order 305-66

1. CODE NAME APACHE (Search and Destroy mission)
2. DATES OF OPERATION 090600H June 1966 to 122000H June 1966
3. LOCATION QUAN LY TIN area
4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

2nd Bn, (-) (Rein), 5th Marines	LTCOL MOORE
Company "E" (Rein)	CAPT COOPER
Company "F" (Rein)	1STLT BURGETT

5. TASK ORGANIZATION

2nd Battalion (-)(Rein), 5th Marines	LTCOL MOORE
DET H&S Company	
HST, 1st Shore Party Bn	
Plt. Co "A", 1st Recon Bn	
Squad Eng, 1st Eng. Bn	
"E" Btry, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines	
4.2 Mortar Btry, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines	
"L" Btry, 4th Bn, 11th Marines	
Company "A" (-), 1st Tank Bn	
Company "E" (Rein)	
FO Team	
FAC Team	
Sqd Eng, 1st Eng Bn	
Sqd, TAM KY PF	
S-2 Scout	
Interpreters	
Tank Liaison, 1st Tank Bn	
1 Section 81mm Mortar, H&S Company	
2 Sniper Teams, 5th Marines	
Company "E" (Rein)	
FO Team	
FAC Team	

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOB DSR 3203.10

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Sqd Eng, 1st Eng Bn
Sqd TAM KY PF
S-2 Scouts
Interpreters
Tank Liaison, 1st Tank Bn
Section 81MM Mortar, H&S Company
3 Sniper Teams, 5th Marines

BATTALION RESERVE

Company "B", 1st Bn, 5th Marines

6. SUPPORTING FORCES

a. Supporting Arms

(1) Air

(a) Medical Evacuation

1. All Med Evacs were priority requests and were requested VIA the TACP local or Battalion TAC net to the ALO. The ALO relayed the request to the DASC VIA the TAR net.
2. There were a total of four medical evacuation requests.
3. All Medical Evacuations were accompanied by a UH-1E Helicopter.
4. The reaction time averaged 30 minutes. In one instance, a troop lift helicopter took a med-evac after debarking troops.
5. Regardless of tactical conditions, all medical evacuation missions were accomplished.

(b) Resupply

1. Since there were two UH-34 helicopters being utilized in direct support, resupply missions were on an as necessary basis. These aircraft were also utilized for reconnaissance and other necessary functions.
2. The detachment of HST personnel controlled the direct support Helicopters and all requests were made VIA the logistics net.

(c) Aerial Observers

1. There were no AO missions requested but several AO aircraft were utilized by contacting them on the Battalion TAC net.
2. Once communications were established the AO gave us excellent support.

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(d) Close Air Support

1. On each landing, close air support aircraft prepped the LZ prior to landing and remained on station for a CAS mission. One mission was called utilizing these aircraft.
2. There was one request for CAS but it had to be cancelled because of another commitment.

7. INTELLIGENCE

a. VC strength in the proposed area of operations carried by the 1st MarDiv is one RF Bn (32nd). Two LF Companies (A-19 and A-21). All information reported as of 16 May. The LF Company strengths were estimated at 120 men and the Battalion at 250.

b. Subsequent intelligence received from a VC defector to the village chief of KY CHANH (BT4013) located a RF Rest Hqs at BT328137. A S&D mission did not make contact. On 121245H Company UE (BT348035) discovered a Political/Training Camp. This was in response to additional information received in the interrogation report. The area had three large buildings and 5 grass huts. The largest was 50' X 20'. One appeared to be a barracks, and one an administrative building containing three empty bookshelves and a podium. The third was a jail including stocks and cages. The area was intensively tunneled with one measuring 50 meters in length.

Approximately 500 meters to the North a 3 Ton rice cache was found under the false floor of a hut during the same search.

In the operation area, moderate contact was made with local force villagers and no contact was had with any identified Main Force units. No unusual uniformity was observed in the clothing or equipment of the VC. Interrogations of villagers were generally consistent in reference to many VC LF units passing through RUE HUC (4) BT30514513 - 4 days ago.

Significant intelligence currently being developed was additional order of battle information included in a 14 lb bundle of documents discovered hidden in a hollow tree limb.

The villages were noted by hedgerows, and thick brush and surrounded by rice paddies, making cover and concealment poor to excellent. There were some trenches and fighting holes in area but none were noteworthy.

Long range observation is excellent to good from hills located at BT 311158, BT335134, BT312130; BT281120 and all are dominated by BT310110. Short range observation is good from the smaller hills but fields of fire are restricted by hedgerows and by the few populated areas. Draws and valleys are covered by dense undergrowth.

Obstacles were generally non-existent; the area of operation was bounded on the North by the SONG EA KY which was fordable at BT280145 and BT 280134. The ridge line of hill 302 cut the Southern portion of the operation area in half. Weather had no adverse effects on the operation.

8. Mission

a. Commencing on R-Day be prepared to support reconnaissance platoon operation in the QUAN LY TIN area (BT3021)

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b. On order on D-Day execute a Heliborne assault into LZ general vicinity of QUAN LY TIN area.

c. Upon completion of Helo assault establish a combat base and conduct search and destroy operation in assigned TAOR.

9. Concept of Operation

a. Reconnaissance units will be inserted by Helicopters, landing zone CANARY, SPARROW and ROBIN, establish observation posts and will reconnoiter the TAOR as indicated in Annex A operation overlay.

b. At L-Hour on D-Day the 2nd Bn, 5th Marines will Helolift one company (Rein), into landing zones indicated in Annex H operation overlay. Upon landing objective COBRA will be seized and a Battalion Combat Base established from which Battalion will conduct extensive search and destroy operations throughout the TAOR.

10. Execution The initial briefing on the operation was conducted on 5 June 1966. Another briefing was held on 7 June and the operation order was then effected.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>GROUP</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
7 June 1966			Issued 2nd Bn, 5th Marines Operation Order 305-66.
090600	June		Preparation for operation APACHE; personnel mustering by Helo Teams at Bn landing zone (BT468073).
090600	June		Company "E" departed Bn, LZ for LZ COBRA (see operation overlay).
090620	June		Company "F" departed Bn LZ for LZ COBRA (see operation overlay).
090620	June		Company "E" landed approx 1000 meters East of scheduled LZ (BT312135).
090645	June		Command Group "B" departed Bn LZ for LZ COBRA. Bn Commander departed for area of operation by HU-1E.
090700	June		Command Group "B" landed in LZ (BT312135).
090715	June		Company "F" departed Bn LZ for LZ COBRA.
090730	June		Company "F" landed in LZ (BT312135) all units completed landing of Bn in LZ BT 312135.
090740	June		Negative enemy contact. Position are as follows Bn Command Group BT306149 Company "E" BT300144 Company "F" BT308145
090745	June		Assault was conducted toward PHU DUC #4 from hill 68 complex. Light enemy contact was encountered during the assault, all at long ranges from snipers and searches of area produced negative results.
091020	June		PSY Warfare aircraft orbited on station to end of the day and was utilized frequently for loudspeaker messages and leaflet drops.
091120	June		2nd Bn, 5th Marines captured the village of PHU DUC #4 and established CP (BT305146).
091230	June		Company "E" discovered 4 tons of rice in a cave (BT 305146). Rice was later rationed out.

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DATE TIME GROUP EVENT

Documents and uniforms were found in the hollow of a tree while radio operator elevated a 292 radio antenna.

091230 June Sniper and A/W fire has been encountered during the Bn sweep of the village of PHU DUE (4) and surrounding area. Resulting in 4 VC KIA confirmed. 4 WIA possible and 4 VC captured.

091330 June Company "B" 1/5 (Bn Reserve) commenced Helo lift into LZ (BT305116).

091335 June Company "B" completed Helo lift.

091400 June Platoon PF's were helolifted from TAM KY to BT305116. and were assigned to companies for coordinated combat operations.

091415 June 4.2 Battery commenced landing in LZ BT305146.

091500 June 4.2 Battery Helilift completed, 105mm Howitzer operations commenced in support of Bn.

091615 June Recon Bn OP observed 3 VC on trail BT275123. Arty mission was fired with excellent coverage, resulting in 2 KIA possible.

091730 June 2 PF's attached to Bravo 1/5, heard a rifle shot and observed 7 VC running, one with a rifle. PF's with the aid of Bravo 1/5 captured 7 VC. Search was conducted for rifle but were unable to find weapon. At BT309177

091800 June Helilift of 105mm Howitzer Btry completed. It should be noted that this is the first time a Battery has been Helilifted in support of this Battalion in VIETNAM. Company "F" on search of PHU DUC #4 captured 2 VCS without ID cards. Suspects evaced to ITT.

091930 June Company "E" captured 1 VCS without ID card on sweep of village PHU DUC #4, evaced to ITT. At end of period CP locations were as follows:

Bn CP	305146
Company "E"	300144
Company "F"	307144
Company "B"	305142

092145 June 8-14 VC attempted to penetrate the Bn perimeter of Echo Company. Three members of a Company ambush took the VC under fire, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 WIA. Remainder of the VC were physically pursued from perimeter. Elsewhere, an ambush squad from Company "F" ambushed 2 VC crossing a river at BT308149, resulting in 2 VC KIA confirmed.

092350 June Flare ship called on station.

100330 June Emergency resupply of arty and mortar illumination ammunition was Helilifted into the LZ.

100830 June Company "B" on S&D mission at BT310126 received A/W fire and S/A fire from BT310123. Company returned fire and assaulted enemy position. VC fled. Trench and barbed wire found partially destroyed by M-79 rds.

100905 June Company "E" S&D mission at BT278035 received A/W and S/A fire from BT278124. Company "E" returned fire and resulting in 1 VC KIA confirmed and 2 possible WIA.

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<u>DATE TIME GROUP</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
101040H June	Sparrow Hawk Platoon 2/5 landed in LZ BT278117 to support Co "E" in assault on objective of NGOC NHA (4) at BT269124. Close support aircraft conducted air strike on suspected enemy position to ensure unopposed insertion into LZ.
101100 June	Light enemy contact encountered during this period. Sniper fire, all at long range, was received by Co "B" on S&D mission. Search of area at BT317120 resulted in finding trench line and barbed wire extending from BT308121, BT309123, BT312123.
101150 June	Company "E" conducted assault on objective hamlet of NGOC NHA (4) BT269124 with no resistance. 1 VCS was captured with large amount of money in his possession. Suspect was evaced to ITT.
101530 June	Plt Patrol from Co "E" observed an estimated 35 VC at BT267129. FO called arty mission resulting in 18 VC KIA probable and 14 VC WIA probable.
101600 June	A VC unaware of 2 plts of "E" Company in area entered the Marines Co CP. Arty F9 and Bn S-2 scout fired at him resulting in 1 VC KIA.
101530 June	Arty mission fired on 32 VC at BT267129 causing two large secondary explosions which shot flames 200 ft. into the air. Smoke resembled that of a fuel fire.
101605	A Patrol from Co "F" at BT306147 captured 1 VCS pointed out by PF. Suspect was evaced to ITT.
101655 June	Recon Bn CP observed 2 women pulling a body from a spider hole at BT275124 in which a Marine had thrown a hand grenade 30 min before during a Co "E" sweep of the area.
101745 June	2 Plts from Co "E" on patrol returning to Bn CP observed 2 VC running from a village at BT278123. Patrol fired 10 rds S/A, resulting in 1 VC KIA.
101750 June	Recon Bn CP observed 10 VC at BT273114. Arty mission was fired resulting in 1 VC KIA confirmed, 3 VC KIA probable and 4 VC WIA probable.
101755 June	Plt from Co "E" at BT278123 captured 2 VCS and killed 1 VC attempting to escape from a village at BT278124 during a company sweep.
110530 June	2 Marines on perimeter watch of Co "F" observed 2 VC in illumination light. They fired 15 rds S/A, resulting in 1 VC KIA probable. Search at first light revealed blood where body was dragged off and found a bag with 60 rds of sub-machine gun ammo and training note book with map symbols. Documents and material forwarded to Regiment.
110625 June	Based on intelligence information received indicating location of enemy 5th Main Force Regt Hq in vicinity of BT27138 at 110625 Co "B" was launched by helicopters into blocking position at BT334119. Co "F" was helilifted into LZ at BT322144 with mission of sweeping toward suspected enemy position at BT377138. Extensive

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>GROUP</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
			preparation fire on all LZ's by artillery, Mortar and air was conducted.
110710	June		Co "B" BT334119 received 6 rds S/A fire from unknown number of VC in vicinity BT333118. Co "B" returned fire 70 rds S/A A/W 2 LAAW's 1 3.5 WP. Results: 1 VC KIA (confirmed), Co "B" continued mission.
111000	June		An Air Strike was conducted by UH-1E and A-4 Aircraft on 6 VC in a Hamlet, resulting in 6 VC KIA probable.
111200	June		Enemy contact during this period was light and all sniper fire was fired from long range. Search of areas produced negative results.
111625			1 VC KIA by a patrol from "F" Company at BT330122 and a grenade was found on body. Bn conducting S&D mission within TAOR. Arty mission was fired on 5 observed VC at BT336135 resulting in large secondary explosion. Results - 5 VC KIA probable.
111900	June		Plt Patrol from Co "B" at BT318124 received 2 USMC WIA as the result of detonating an unknown type of mine. WIA's were med evaced to 1st Med Bn.
111940	June		4 USMC non battle casualties were Med evaced because of illness.
112105	June		H&I 81mm Mortar fire caused large secondary explosion at BT326128.
112340	June		Co "F" in night defensive perimeter received approx 3 rds S/A from undetermined source.
112400	June		No enemy contact during this period.
120600	June		Bn (-) commenced sweep of South Eastern portion of TAOR - see Frag order 1-305-66.
120625	June		First units of Co, "F" in LZ BT317088.
120650	June		Bn Command Group Alpha in LZ BT317088.
120710	June		Bn Command Group Alpha in position BT319089 (ARVN outpost).
120750	June		Co "E" Helilifted from BT304144.
120815	June		Co "E" touchdown LZ BT340099 after extensive arty and air preparation of LZ.
120830	June		Co "E" received 1 USMC WIA from A/W fire; USMC WIA Med Evac to 1st Med Bn.
120832	June		Arty mission fire on 4 VC reported by recon Bn OP. 4 VC KIA in subsequent fire at BT277124
120905	June		Co "E" observed a VC machine gun position at BT345084. Area was strafed by Hueys. Group of VC observed retreating and 81mm Mortar mission fired, resulting in 3 VC KIA, 2 VC WIA confirmed.
120910	June		Co "E" located 1 Vietnamese child, 1 woman, and 1 man who had reportedly been prisoners of the VC for four months. Co "E" located what appeared to have been a VC base camp. Camp was all underground and could not have been spotted by air recon. Co "E" destroyed fortifications with demolitions and continued sweep of valley to the Northwest toward Bn CP. 3 VCS returned with patrol for evacuation.

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>GROUP</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
121000	June	1966	Two Hamlet Chiefs volunteered information that the VC were establishing an ambush from BT289127 to 291128 to ambush Co "F" elements moving NW past hill 130. Unobserved arty and mortar missions were fired on suspected VC ambush sites. Co "F" then swept area without establishing enemy contact.
121010	June		One VC KIA found by PFs at BT291128.
121200	June		Co "E" conducted search of Hamlets at BT348084 and found networks of secret tunnels in hamlets. Tunnels were destroyed with demolitions.
121220	June		Co "F" called arty fire on position from which sniper fire was received (BT289095) while Co was on S&D mission. Sniper fire was silenced and 1 VC KIA probable was estimated.
121245	June		Co "E" plt patrol at BT348085 discovered 3 tons of rice under a false floor of a hamlet house. Rice was destroyed with demolition and fire.
121250	June		Received order from Regiment to terminate Operation APACHE and return to home base. Co "F" directed to continue sweep to Bn CP BT305146.
121350	June		Command Group Alpha extracted by Helicopter from BT 319089 to LZ at BT305146.
121430	June		Co "E" and "F" arrived at base camp BT305146.
121510	June		2nd Bn, 11th Marines units commenced Helo lift from Battalion perimeter to hill 35.
121630	June		Bn Units and supporting units standing by for extraction by helicopter.
121830	June		2nd Bn, 11th Marines completed Helilift.
121835	June		Co "F" commenced Helilift to Hill 69 at 1900 H. In conjunction with Co "F", Bn Command Group Alpha Helilifted out of Bn perimeter, landing at Hill 69 at 1920H.
121928	June		Company "E" completed Helilift to hill 69.
121930	June		Co "B" commenced Helilift to Hill 54.
122000	June		Co "B" and HST detachment completed extraction.
122025	June		Operation APACHE terminated.

11. RESULTS

a. Enemy

(1) Personnel

(a)	VC KIA	24
(b)	VC KIA (probable)	0
(c)	VC KIA (possible)	41
(d)	VC WIA	0
(e)	VC WIA (probable)	0
(f)	VC WIA (possible)	24
(g)	VCC	13
(h)	VCS	19

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(2) Equipment Captured

(a) 7 Tons of rice, 25 lbs of documents, assorted types of uniforms, Hand Grenade, 60 rds Sub-Machine Gun ammo, training note book with map symbols.

(b) Friendly

1. US personnel

a. KIA	0
b. Died of Wounds	0
c. WIA	3

(3) U.S. Equipment

(a) NONE

12. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. The administrative plan was adequate in all respects.

a. Communication. Communications with Regiment on the FM Tactical net was poor. The location of the Regimental CP behind Hill 35, and the fact that the Bn Command Group was in a valley accounted for this net's inadequacy. Communication on the Battalion Tactical net from the Battalion Command Group to the Battalion LP located on Hill 69 was good because the CP is located on top of a Hill. For future operations, Regiment will have to locate radios on high ground if reliable communications is to be maintained.

Interference was received on the Battalion Tactical net from 1000 to 1300 on 12 June 1966. Transmission from the "A" Command Group to the "B" Command Group was interrupted during this period. It was never determined if this was friendly or enemy interference. At approximately 1300, communication between Alpha and Bravo Command Groups was restored and neither group had changed positions. No further interference was experienced.

b. Medical Evaluation. Medical casualties consisted primarily of heat exhaustion. Treatment was performed in the field and evacuation to 1st Medical Battalion was not necessary for further treatment and evaluation. Combat casualties consisted primarily of shrapnel wound which were treated in the field by Company Corpsmen and directly evacuated to 1st Medical Battalion for definitive treatment.

13. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES

a. APACHE was the first Battalion sized operation of this command in which Vietnamese Popular Forces troops have been integrated into our normal company structure. The PF's were assigned approximately ten per rifle company, and were employed extensively in searching native communities, identification and interrogation of suspects, and for their familiarity with this particular geographical locale. They worked hard and it is felt that the value of their contribution to the success of the operation was inestimable.

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b. For the first time, the battalion established its combat base in an occupied hamlet, essentially remaining there for the entire operational period. Companies used this base as one from which daily search and destroy missions were launched. The occupying of a village was felt to have precluded a major VC night assault on the Battalion perimeter, and was an obstacle to the VC in their utilizing whatever mortar potential they may have had. This type of combat base technique was extremely successful and worthy of careful consideration in future operations.

c. Medcap patrols were conducted in PHU DUC (4) hamlet daily, resulting in medical treatment being administered to several hundred Vietnamese civilians. This was a very measurable factor in dispelling the fears and anxieties of all those residents of a previously undisputed Viet Cong area.

d. C-46 Helicopters were employed to lift a Battery each of 105mm Howitzers and 4.2 Mortars into the operational area. Positioned within an extended perimeter of the Combat Base, they were ready to deliver supporting fire anywhere in the FAOR only minutes after being landed. Communications problems with artillery were minimized because of their proximity to the operations, and that proximity also created an infinitely better mutual understanding between the infantry and supporting arms. Artillery support was outstanding throughout the operation.

14. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS

From the standpoint of coordination of supporting arms, long range logistical support and rapid Heliborne movement of troops to initiate and exploit physical contact with enemy forces, operation APACHE is considered a success. All contacts and intelligence relating to possible enemy groups or installations in the operational area were subjects of immediate reaction, and the availability of Helicopters to transport troops and equipment to selected landing zones was a major factor in this reaction.

Minor problems in land/air coordination developed during early phases of the operation, but were in large part resolved as the operation progressed. Similarly, coordination of logistical air support with the HST provided minor problems initially, but as individual requesting units became accustomed to the normal proven procedures, the process of supply to the Combat Base was smooth and completely adequate.

In all respects, the coordination of air, ground, and supporting arms under combat conditions was an invaluable experience which will reap many future benefits. As far as known Operation APACHE is the first time 105 Howitzers and 4.2 Mortars were helilifted in to the battle area in active USMC operations in VIETNAM.

15. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Prior to the Operation, there was sufficient time to coordinate both generalities and details among ground, air and artillery units participating. This minimized the problems which occurred periodically, and accounted for an exceptionally close rapport. It is recommended that all future operations include as detailed coordination and reconnaissance with the units concerned as time will permit.

b. Logistical support and troop movement by air must remain within the purview of only one unit; in this case, the HST. Problems in this area

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of concern were directly proportionate to the number of units or individuals who attempted to assist.

c. Popular Forces units worked particularly well with the Marines in this operation, but an interpreter was assigned to each company for this reason. Without an adequate number of interpreters, the language barrier might have proven insurmountable, and the PF attachments more of a liability under combat conditions than an asset. It is therefore considered imperative that if PF's are to be integrated into operational units, a minimum of one interpreter per company must be allotted; preferably one per platoon.

d. As much as possible, liaison and reconnaissance must accurately predict communications difficulties to be encountered within the geography of the operational area, and plan on alternate means of direct or relayed communications.

Walter Moore
WALTER MOORE

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TAB B ENCLOSURE(1)

Command Chronology for the period 1-30 June 1966

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2nd Bn, 5th Marines
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM
 082000H June 1966
 03A15966

FRAG ORDER 7-66

Ref: (a) Maps VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS sheet 6757 IV

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

LY TIN DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS (-)

Heavy Section of Tanks - Co A, 1st TK Bn
 Light Section of Flame Tanks - Co A, 1st TK Bn
 Forward observer TM - E Battery, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines
 Demolition TM - Co G, 2nd Bn, 5th Marines
 Tank Liaison TM - Co A, 1st TK Bn

Regional Force Co 238 (-)

Regional Force Co 744 (-)

Popular Force Plt

Political Action Team

1. Situation

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) Approximately 8-10 VC have reportedly constructed secret caves in the hamlet of KHUONG NHON (1) and are using these as hiding places during daylight hours.
- (2) An unknown number of VC have reportedly constructed secret caves and tunnel networks in the hamlet of KHUONG NHON (2) and are using these as hiding places during the daylight hours.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) Regional Force Companies 744 and 238 will conduct a 2 platoon sweep of KHUONG NHON (1) and (2).
- (2) 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines will provide artillery support.

2. Mission:

Elements of Regional Force Companies 744 and 238 will conduct a search

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and destroy operation designed to eliminate all communist insurgent forces in the hamlets of KHUONG NHON (1) and (2). Additionally they are to locate and destroy caves, tunnels, or other Viet Cong fortifications in this area.

3. Execution:

- a. Concept of operation. With one heavy section of Gun Tanks attached and a light section of flame tanks on call, one plt of Regional Force Company 744 and one Plt of Regional Force Company 238 will conduct a search and clear operation of the hamlets of KHUONG NHON (1) and (2). The sweep will be conducted from East to West with the exact route of advance to be designated by the Vietnamese unit Commander. Artillery support will be on call and missions fired at the discretion of the unit commander.
- b. Regional Force Company 238 conduct a search and clear operation in the hamlets of KHUONG NHON (1) and (2). The exact execution of the mission will be designated by the operation commander.
- c. Regional Force Company 744. Assume the same mission as Regional Force Company 238 and will be coordinated by the operation Commander.
- d. Popular Force Platoon. Assume the same mission as Regional Force Company 238 and will be coordinated by the operation commander.
- e. Political Action Team. Will be on call and utilized at the discretion of the operation commander.
- f. Coordinating Instructions
 - (1) The artillery forward observer team, tank liaison team, and demolition team will be entrucked at hill 35 at ~~090700~~.
 - (2) Regional Force Companies 238 and 744 will be entrucked at hill 40 at ~~090730~~H and transported to LOD to arrive by ~~090800~~H. (H-Hour)
 - (3) Popular Force Platoon will make junction⁽²⁾ with the heavy section of gun tanks at coordinates BT448091 not later than ~~090900~~H. (H-Hour)
 - (4) Heavy section of gun tanks will make junction⁽²⁾ with the Popular Forces Platoon not later than ~~090800~~H at coordinates BT448091.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Administration.

No Change

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b. Logistics

- (1) All personnel carry 2 canteens of water
- (2) All personnel will carry a basic allowance of ammunition.
- (3) There will be no resupply.

5. Command and Communications

a. Command

- (1) The operation will be commanded by the LY TIN district Headquarters.

b. Communications.

- (1) Artillery forward Observer teams will come up on the conduct of fire net at 090830H
- (2) Tank Liaison team will come up on the tank tactical net at 090830H.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MOORE

L. E. Wood

L.E. WOOD

Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Battalion S-3


ANNEX A (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 7-66

DISTRIBUTION:

CO, 5th Marines	(3)
CC, 1/5	(2)
CC, 2/5	(5)
CC, Co G, 2/5	(2)
CC, E Btry 2/11	(3)
CC, Co A, 1st Tank Bn	(3)
LY TIN	(2)
File	(2)
Command Chronology	(1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
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2nd Battalion, 5th Marines
Chu Lai, Viet Nam
082000 June 1966
03 A 15966



ANNEX A (Operational Overlay) to 2nd Bn, 5th Marines Frag Order 7-66

Ref: Map, Viet Nam, 1:50,000, AMS Series L701, Sheet 6757 III.

Time Zone: H

BY COMMAND OF LT. COL. MOORE

L. E. Wood

L. E. WOOD

MAJ, USMC

BATTALION S-3

DISTRIBUTION: To Frag Order 7-66

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2nd Battalion, 5th Marines
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
222000H June 1966

FRAG ORDER 14-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS L7014, Sheet 6739IV

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A (Task Organization) to Frag Order 14-66

1. Situation

a. Enemy Forces

(1) See Annex B (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces

(1) LY TIN District Headquarters, Popular Forces Contingent

2. Mission

To provide a blocking force for the LY TIN District Popular Force Contingent while a Search and Destroy operation is conducted in the hamlets of KHUONG HIEP (2), KHUONG BINH (2), and KHUONG THO (1)

3. Execution

a. Concept of operation

Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day 2 Companies of Marines and a Popular Force unit will form blocking positions to surround one or all the hamlets of KHUONG HIEP (2), KHUONG BINH (2) KHUONG THO (1). A Popular Force unit from LY TIN District will then commence a Search and Destroy operation from route 1 moving generally in a Southwesterly direction.

b. Company F (-)(Rein)

(1) Commencing at H-Hour minus 60 min proceed from vic hill 35 to vic of BT448077.

(2) Form a blocking position generally along North-South grid line 45 from vic grid coordinates BT448087 to vic grid coordinates BT448064.

(3) Remain in position and allow no one to pass through your lines until further orders.

c. Company H (-)(Rein)

(1) Commencing at H-Hour minus 60 min proceed from vic of hill 69 to vic of BT459072.

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(2) Form a blocking position to run generally along North-South grid line 46 from vic of coordinates BT458083 to vic of coordinates BT458064.

(3) Remain in position and allow no one to pass through your lines until further ordered.

d. 81mm Mortar Platoon (-)

(1) General Support

(2) Remain in position on hill 69 and provide supporting fires as requested.

e. Battalion Reserve

(1) 3rd Platoon, Company H

(1) Remain in position on hill 69 and provide supporting fires as requested.

f. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Comply with published rules of engagement.

(2) Submit Spot Reports as required.

(3) H-Hour to be announced.

(4) Be careful in the direction of firing because of the proximity of friendly forces.

(5) Be extremely careful while moving into position to identify a target as enemy before firing.

(6) Accompanying the Popular Force contingent from LY TIN District will be a Civil Affairs Team, a Med Cap team, and a Liaison Officer with a radio on the Bn Tac net.

(7) Rifle Companies will insure that the Southern end of their blocking positions are tied in with the contingent of Popular Forces that will form the Southern end of the "box".

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. No Change

5. Command and Communications

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- a. Battalion Command Post will be located in the vicinity of hill 69.
- b. No change in Communications procedures.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MOORE

L.E. Wood

L.E. WOOD
Major U.S. Marine Corps
Battalion S-3

ANNEXES

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Overlays

DISTRIBUTION

1st MarDiv (Rein)	(2)
5th Marines	(5)
2/5	(20)
MAG 36	(2)
MAG 12	(2)
ITT	(1)
1st Med Bn	(1)
LY TIN	(2)
11th Marines	(2)

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2nd Bn, 5th Marines
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
222000H June 1966

Annex A (Task Organization) To Frag Order 14-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS 17014,, Sheet 6239IV

Time Zone H

2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (Rein)

Company E (-)(Rein)

Det H&S Company

FO TM 1st Section, 81mm Mortar Plt

FO TM, Btry E, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines

Company H (-)(Rein)

Det H&S Company

FO TM 4th Section, 81mm Mortar Plt

Det, Med Flt

FO TM, Btry E, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines

81mm Mortar Plt (-)

Det H&S Co

Det, Med Flt

Battalion Reserve - 3rd Plt, Company H

Det H&S Company

Det, Med Flt

LTCOL MOORE
CAPT COOPER

1STLT DOHERTY

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MOORE

L. E. Wood

L.E. WOOD

Major U.S. Marine Corps

Battalion S-3

DISTRIBUTION: Frag Order 14-66

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2nd Battalion, 5th Marines
 CHU LAI, RVN
 222200H June 1966

Annex B (Intelligence) to Frag Order 14-66

Ref: (a) Map: AMS Series L7014 1:50,000; 6739 IV
 (b) 1st MarDiv Intell Sop P3800.1f
 (c) BnO 3800.1b

Time Zone: Hotel

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

On 17 June, an agent reported to Ly Tin District Headquarters that six VC LF guerrillas from the vicinity of KHOUNG NHON (BT 429 093) had moved to the area of BT 451 076. Three cells (three men each) have been reported at intervals in KHOUNG THO (1) BT 452 075 and BT 455 075. Additional reports have been made of VC in the area for an estimated twenty guerillas. The guerillas are believed armed with SMGs, MAS-36 rifles and grenades.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Determine composition, location, and strength of enemy forces in the area of operation.
- b. Determine the possible routes of access and egress, to prevent withdrawal either enemy or civilians.
- c. Determine extent of fortifications and tunneling in area.
- d. Determine possible supply caches and amount of resupply support received from local sources.
- e. Determine frequency of enemy contact with civilians.

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

- a. Orders to subordinate units.
 - (1) Companies "E" and "H" report:
 - (a) Contact with Viet Cong forces.
 - (b) Use of mines and booby traps by the enemy to include type, number and area mined.
 - (c) All engineer accomplishments including tunnels giving type of construction, extent and dimensions.

B-1

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(d) Establish surveillance of all trails to prevent escape of all people in the area.

(2) Medical Section

(a) Report all VCCaptives/VCSuspects as treated.

b. Requests to higher and adjacent units

(1) 5th Marine Regiment

(a) Provide AO support as requested

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Observe and report civilian attitude toward friendly operations.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS

a. References (b) and (c) apply except as modified below:

(1) Capturing units must keep secret from local civilians the fact that a VCC/VCS is being held prisoner.

(2) Scouts (if attached) and companies will have supplies of appropriate tags for prisoners, documents and materials. All weapons will be forwarded to this headquarters by the most expeditious means possible.

(3) All mines and booby traps, unless of a new or unusual type, will be reported and destroyed in place. New or unusual types should be so described and then destroyed by the capturing unit.

5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

a. References (a), (b) and (c) apply.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Utilize maximum concealment and maintain high standards of camouflage, march, light and noise discipline.

b. No member of this command will draw defensive plans, observation plans or other friendly positions directly on maps.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

a. Reference (c) applies.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MOORE

L.E. WOOD
MAJOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS
Battalion S-3

DISTRIBUTION: See (Distribution) to Frag Order 14-66

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
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines
Chu Lai, Viet Nam
222000H June 1966

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ANNEX (C) (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 14-66

Ref: Map; Viet Nam, 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014, Sheet 6739 IV

Time Zone: H



BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MOORE

L. E. Wood

L. E. WOOD
Maj, U.S. Marine Corps
Battalion S-3

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TAB C ENCLOSURE (1)

Command Chronology for the period 1-30 June 1966

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2nd Battalion, 5th Marines
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM
 272000H June 1966

FRAG ORDER 15-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS L7014, Sheet No. 6739 IV

Time Zone: H

1. Situation

a. Enemy Forces

(1) See Current Intsums

b. Friendly Forces

(1) No Change

c. Attachments and Detachments

(1) Light section of Gun Tanks from Co A, 1st Tank Bn.

(2) Section Flame tanks from Co A, 1st Tank Bn.

(3) 2 light sections of Ontos from Co A, 1st AT Bn.

2. Mission. Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day elements of the 2nd Battalion (-)(Rein), 5th Marines will conduct a search and destroy operation in the hamlets of KY LONG (1) and NO NAME village vicinity of BT4305 and BT4405 respectively. The operation is designed to destroy all uninhabited shelters and other covered positions that may be utilized as refuge by the Viet Cong.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operation. Two light sections of Ontos will assume a blocking position on Ontos Ridge vicinity of BT436057. Infantry blocking force will be positioned on a front extending generally along East-West grid line 05 from vicinity of BT431047 to vicinity of BT447047 and also in the vicinity BT432057. A section of flame tanks and a light section of gun tanks with infantry support will sweep the operational area from East To West commencing at H-Hour.

b. Company E

(1) Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day have blocking forces in position as shown on operation overlay.

(2) Remain in blocking position until further ordered.

c. Company H

1
 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS.
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
 DOD DIR 5200.10

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Tab C

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(1) Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day have one squad in a blocking position in vicinity of coordinates BT432057. (See operation overlay)

(2) Provide one squad (rein) to accompany the two light sections of Ontos as security while in position on Ontos Ridge vicinity coordinates BT435057.

(3) Provide one platoon (rein) to accompany the section of Flame tanks and the section of Gun tanks on the sweep of the hamlets of KY LONG (1) vicinity coordinates BT436053 and NO NAME vicinity coordinates BT455053.

d. Company A, 1st Tank Bn

(1) Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day provide one section of Flame tanks and a section of Gun tanks to conduct a sweep of KY LONG (1) and NO NAME. Destroy all uninhabited shelters and positions in KY LONG (1) that could be used as refuge by the Viet Cong, and targets of opportunity in NO NAME hamlet.

e. Company A, 1st AT Bn

(1) Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day have two light sections of Ontos in position as a blocking force on Ontos Ridge vicinity coordinates BT436057.

f. Coordinating Instruction

(1) Operation will be conducted according to published rules of engagement.

(2) An interpreter with a portable loud speaker unit will accompany the sweeping force.

(3) Direct liaison between subordinate units is authorized.

(4) H-Hour is 0630.

(5) D-Day is 29 June 1966.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. No Change

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5. Command and Communications

- a. Beginning H-Hour minus 60 min. guard Battalion Tac net.

Walter Moore

WALTER MOORE
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEX:

- A - (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 15-66


DISTRIBUTION:

1st MarDiv (Rein)	(2)
5th Marines	(5)
2/5	(20)
11th Marines	(5)
1/5	(1)
Co A, 1st Tank Bn	(2)
Co A, 1st AT	(2)
2/7	(1)
LY TIN	(1)

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2nd Battalion, 5th Marines
Ch. Mai, Viet Nam
272000H June 1966

ANNEX A (Operational Overlay) To Frag Order 15-66



1. A platoon (4) of Ontos will leave Hill 35; Take up supporting position with a reinforced Squad from Co "H" on Ontos Ridge.
2. All forces to be in position by 0630.
3. Interpreter will warn natives with loudspeaker.
4. A heavy section of flame tanks and gun tanks with a reinforced platoon from Co "H" will sweep hamlets from east to west.

Ref: Map; Viet Nam, 1:50,000, AMS Series H7014
Sheet 6739 IV

Time Zone: H

Walter Moore

WALTER MOORE
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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